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Abstract—The proliferation and application of machine learn-
ing based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have allowed for
more flexibility and efficiency in the automated detection of
cyber attacks in Industrial Control Systems (ICS). However, the
introduction of such IDSs has also created an additional attack
vector; the learning models may also be subject to cyber attacks,
otherwise referred to as Adversarial Machine Learning (AML).
Such attacks may have severe consequences in ICS systems, as
adversaries could potentially bypass the IDS. This could lead
to delayed attack detection which may result in infrastructure
damages, financial loss, and even loss of life. This paper explores
how adversarial learning can be used to target supervised models
by generating adversarial samples using the Jacobian-based
Saliency Map attack and exploring classification behaviours. The
analysis also includes the exploration of how such samples can
support the robustness of supervised models using adversarial
training. An authentic power system dataset was used to support
the experiments presented herein. Overall, the classification
performance of two widely used classifiers, Random Forest and
J48, decreased by 16 and 20 percentage points when adversarial
samples were present. Their performances improved following
adversarial training, demonstrating their robustness towards
such attacks.
Index Terms—industrial control systems, supervised machine
learning, adversarial machine learning, attack detection, intru-
sion detection system
I. INTRODUCTION
INDUSTRIAL Control Systems (ICS) play a key role inCritical National Infrastructure (CNI) concepts such as
manufacturing, power/smart grids, water treatment plants, gas
and oil refineries, and health-care. Historically, ICS networks
and their components were protected from cyber attacks as
they ran on proprietary hardware and software, and were
connected in isolated networks with no external connection to
the Internet [1]. However, as the world is becoming more inter-
connected, there has been a need to connect ICS components
together and to other networks, allowing remote access and
monitoring functionalities. As a result, ICS are now subject to
a range of security vulnerabilities [1].
Given the importance of these systems, they have become
an attractive target to an attacker. As these systems control
operations in the physical world, the cyber attacks against
them may have major consequences for the environment they
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operate in, and subsequently, its users. It is therefore under-
standable that the security issues surrounding such systems
have become a global issue. Thus, designing robust, secure,
and efficient mechanisms for detecting and defending cyber
attacks in ICS networks is more important than ever [2].
Although there exist several security mechanisms for tradi-
tional IT systems, their integration into ICS systems is chal-
lenging mainly for two reasons; a) ICS devices are resource
constrained, and b) they include legacy systems and devices
that do not support modern security measures. Subsequently,
complementary security solutions, such as passive process data
monitoring, are promising [3]. This has led to a substantial in-
crease in research focusing on ICS tailored Intrusion Detection
Systems (ICS). Such intrusion systems operate by observing
the network or sensor data in order to detect attacks and
anomalies that may affect ICS.
Due to their efficiency in detecting attacks, there has been
a substantial increase in the application and integration of
machine learning within IDSs (e.g. [1], [4]–[10]). However,
the introduction of such systems has introduced an additional
attack vector; the trained models may also be subject to
attacks. The act of deploying attacks towards machine learning
based systems is known as Adversarial Machine Learning
(AML). The aim is to exploit the weaknesses of the pre-
trained model which has “blind spots” between data points it
has seen during training. More specifically, by automatically
introducing slight perturbations to the unseen data points the
model may cross a decision boundary and classify the data
as a different class. As a result, the model’s effectiveness can
be reduced as it is presented with unseen data points that it
cannot associate target values to, subsequently increasing the
number of misclassifications.
The existence of such techniques means that infrastructures
which incorporate machine learning based IDSs may be at risk
of being vulnerable to cyber attacks. In the context of ICS,
AML can be used to manipulate data from actuators or other
devices by including perturbations to cause malicious data
to be classified as being benign, consequently bypassing the
IDS. This could lead to delayed attack detection, information
leakage, financial loss, and even loss of life. It is therefore
understandable that as machine learning based detection mech-
anisms become more widely deployed, the adversary incentive
for defeating them increases. As a result, it is evident that
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machine learning based IDSs must be extensively evaluated
against AML attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which
investigates the behaviour of supervised models against AML,
as well as the defence of such attacks in the context of ICS.
The main contributions of the work presented in this paper are
the empirical investigations into:
• generating adversarial samples from a power system
dataset
• the behaviour of supervised machine learning algorithms
against adversarial samples for intrusion detection in an
ICS system
• how adversarial training can support the robustness of
such models
The study uses a representative power system dataset and
was designed as follows (see Figure 1): 1) randomly split
the power system dataset into training and testing set, each
containing 60% and 40% data points respectively, 2) evaluate
a range of supervised machine learning models and identify
which are the best performing, 3) generate adversarial samples
using the Jacobian-based Saliency map method, 4) evaluate
the performance of the trained models in 2 on the generated
adversarial samples in 3, 5) include a percentage of adversarial
samples from 3 in the training data and re-train and evaluate
the models.
Fig. 1: An overview of the study design
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section
II discusses the relevant work in this research area, Section III
discusses the power system testbed and the generated dataset
which is used to support the experiments in this paper, Section
IV evaluates the performance of a range of supervised classi-
fiers, Section V discusses AML and the methodology followed
to generate adversarial samples, Section VII investigates the
effectiveness of adversarial training as a defence mechanisms,
and finally VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a substantial increase in machine learning
based IDSs for a range of ICS systems. Table I presents a sum-
mary of the existing ICS systems and associated supervised
learning approaches to attack detection and classification in
these contexts. To date, there has been less focus on AML
in this context. Such research has mainly focused on email
spam classifiers, malware detection, and very recently there
has been interest in AML against network IDSs for traditional
networks (e.g. [11]–[13]).
More specifically, both Nelson et al. [14] and Zhou et al.
[15] demonstrate that an adversary can exploit and successfully
bypass the machine learning methods employed in spam filters
by modifying a small percentage of the original training data.
Moreover, Grosse et al. [16] evaluate the robustness of a
neural network trained on the DREBIN Android malware
dataset. They report that it is possible to confuse the model
by perturbing a small amount of the features in the training
set. Such an attack is considered to be a white box attack,
as in order to be successful, the adversary needs to have
access or knowledge of the dataset and the features it includes.
Furthermore, Hu and Tan [17] proposed a more advanced
adversarial technique which uses the concept of Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) to successfully attack malware
classifiers without requiring any knowledge of the data and
the system. This is known as a black box attack.
In the context of ICSs, there exist only a handful of
investigations into AML attacks. Specifically, Zizzo et al. [18]
showcased a simple AML attack against an Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) classifier which was applied on an ICS
dataset. However, this work is at a preliminary stage as the
adversarial samples were generated by manually selecting the
feature/acutator values to be perturbed. Yaghoubi and Fainekos
[19] proposed a gradient based search approach which was
evaluated on a Simulink model of a steam condenser. However,
this approach is efficient only against a handful of systems
that may specifically employ Recurrent Neural Networks
(RNN) with smooth activation functions. Finally, Erba et
al. [3] demonstrated two types of real-time evasion attacks,
again using Recurrent Neural Network models, and used an
autoencoder to generate adversarial samples, which is com-
putationally complex. Neither of these aforementioned works
investigate defence methods against AML. Conclusively, it is
evident that there is room to investigate AML and the defence
against such attacks for current IDSs in ICS systems that are
supported by supervised learning. Moreover, as Table I shows,
Recurrent Neural Networks are yet to gain prominence in
attack detection in an ICS context - with algorithms such as
Naive Bayes, Random Forest, SVM, and J48 being much more
widely used. We therefore base our experiments in defending
against AML on these methods as the state of the art in ML-
driven attack detection methods for ICS.
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Work Dataset Machine Learning Models
[4] Gas Pipeline Naive Bayes, Random Forest, SVM, J48, OneR
[20] Power System OneR, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, SVM, JRipper + Adaboost
[21] Power system (synthetic) Naive Bayes, Random Forests, SVM
[22] SWaT SVM, J48, Random Forest
[23] SCADA/ICS J48, Naive Bayes
[24] Gas Pipeline SVM, Random Forest
[25] SCADA/Modbus Decision Tree, K-Nearest Neighbor, SVM, OCSVM
[6] SCADA Testbed Random Forest, J48, Logistic Regression, Naive Bayes
[26] Power Grid, Water Plant, Gas Plant J48, Random Forest, Naive Bayes, SVM, JRipper + Adaboost
[27] Wind Turbines SVM
[28] SCADA Testbed SVM, Decision Tree, and Random Forest
[29] Power System SVM, J48, Neural Network
[30] SCADA Naive Bayes, BayesNet, J48
[31] SCADA Testbed Decision Tree, Random Forest
[32] Power System Random Forest
[33] Wind Turbine Decision Trees (J48, Random Forest, CART, Ripper, etc.)
[5] SCADA Testbed Bayesian Network
[34] SCADA Testbed Long Short Term Memory (RNN)
[1] SWaT 1D Convolutional Networks
[10] ICS Testbed Neural Network (Error-back propagation and Levenberg-Marquardt)
[8] SWaT Long Short Term Memory (RNN)
[9] SCADA Network Traffic One-Class SVM
[35] ICS Testbed Long Short Term Memory (RNN)
TABLE I: Summary of current work on Intrusion Detection Systems in Industrial Control Systems
III. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CASE STUDY: POWER
SYSTEM
Mississippi State University and Oak Ridge National Labo-
ratory implemented a scaled-down version of a power system
framework. Although this system is relatively small, it captures
the core function and is considered as being a representative
example of a larger power system [36]. Figure 2 illustrates in
more detail the power system framework configuration and the
components used for generating the datasets in which support
the experiments in this paper.
Fig. 2: Power System Framework Testbed [37]
More specifically, the components of the power system
include:
• G1 and G2 are the main generators.
• R1, R2, R3, and R4 are the Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs) responsible for switching the breakers (BR1, BR2,
BR3, BR4), which are automatically operated electrical
switches designed to protect electrical circuits from dam-
age caused by excess current from an overload or short
circuit, on and off.
• Each IED automatically controls one breaker (e.g. R1
controls BR1, R2 controls BR2, etc.)
• The IEDs use a distance protection scheme which trips
the breaker on detected faults (whether they are valid or
invalid) since they have no internal validation to detect
the difference.
• Operators can also manually issue commands to the IEDs
to manually trip the breakers. The manual override is
used when performing maintenance on the lines or other
system components.
• There are also other network monitoring devices con-
nected on the testbed, such as SNORT and Syslog servers.
A. Dataset
A total of 15 datasets containing both benign and malicious
data points were generated from the power system testbed
by [36]. These data points have been further categorised
into three main classes; ‘no event’ instances, ‘natural event’
instances, and ‘attack event’ instances. Both the ‘no event’
and ‘natural event’ instances are grouped together to represent
benign activity. To generate the malicious data, attacks from 5
scenarios were deployed on the power system. These attacks
are described as follows:
1) Short-circuit fault. This is a short in a power line
and can occur in various locations along the line. The
location is indicated by the percentage range.
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2) Line maintenance. One or more relays are disabled on
a specific line to do maintenance for that line.
3) Remote tripping command injection attack. This is
an attack that sends a command to a relay which causes
a breaker to open. It can only be done once an attacker
has penetrated outside defenses.
4) Relay setting change attack. Relays are configured
with a distance protection scheme. The attacker changes
the setting to disable the relay function so that the relay
will not trip for a valid fault or a valid command.
5) Data injection attack. A valid fault is imitated by
changing values to parameters such as the current,
voltage, and sequence components. This attack aims to
blind the operator and causes a black out.
For the purposes of the work described in this paper, all 15
datasets were used. The dataset consisted of 55,663 malicious
and 22,714 benign data points.
IV. SUPERVISED MACHINE LEARNING
To explore how well supervised classification algorithms
can learn to detect cyber attacks in an ICS environment,
the performance of supervised machine learning when the
corresponding data discussed in Section III-A was used to train
the classification model and evaluated. The following Sections
report the features present in the power systems dataset, as well
as describing the methodology behind selecting and training
the best performing supervised classifiers.
A. Feature Selection
In order to perform machine learning classification experi-
ments, it is essential to identify which attributes best describe
the dataset. In this case, the data points within the power
system dataset contain attributes associated with synchropha-
sor measurements and basic network security mechanisms. A
synchrophasor measurement unit is a device which measures
the electrical waves on an electricity grid, using a common
time source for synchronization. The dataset contains a total
of 128 features [37]. These features are described in more
detail as follows:
• 29 types of measurements from each synchrophasor mea-
surement unit. In this specific power system testbed, there
are 4 PMUs. Therefore, the dataset contains a total of 116
synchrophasor measurement columns.
• 12 types of measurements of control panel logs, snort
alerts, and relay logs of the 4 synchrophasor measurement
unit and relay.
Table IV-A summarises the features included in the dataset,
as well as their corresponding descriptions. More specifically,
the index of each feature is in the form of “R#-Signal
Reference”. The “R ‘#’ ” specifies the type of measurement
from the synchrophasor measurement unit. For instance, “R1-
PA1:VH” corresponds to the “Phase A voltage phase angle”
measured by “PMU R1”.
Feature Description
PA1-PA3:VH PA1:VH PA3:VH Phase A
PM1: V -PM3:V C Voltage Phase Angle
PA4:IH - PA6:IH Phase A - C Current Phase Angle
PM4: I PM6: I Phase A - C Current Phase Magnitude
PA7:VH PA9:VH Pos. Neg. Zero Voltage Phase Angle
PM7: V PM9: V Pos. Neg. Zero Voltage Phase Magnitude
PA10:VH - PA12:VH Pos. Neg. Zero Current Phase Angle
PM10: V - PM1 Pos. Neg. Zero Current Phase Magnitude
F Frequency for relays
DF Frequency Delta (dF/dt) for relays
PA:Z Appearance Impedance for relays
PA:ZH Appearance Impedance Angle for relays
S Status Flag for relays
TABLE II: Features included as part of the power system
dataset
B. Model Training
To explore how well supervised machine learning algo-
rithms can detect cyber attacks in an ICS environment, the
corresponding power system dataset was used to evaluate a
range of state-of-the-art classifiers. In the case of identifying
whether a datapoint is malicious or benign, classification
is evaluated relative to the training dataset, producing four
outputs:
• true positives (TP) - data points are predicted as being
malicious, when they are indeed malicious.
• true negatives (TN) - data points are predicted as being
benign, when they are indeed benign.
• false positives (FP) - data points are predicted as being
malicious, when in fact, they are benign.
• false negatives (FN) - data points are predicted as being
benign, when in fact, they are malicious.
Subsequently, these output are used to evaluate the classifi-
cation performance of the trained model using Precision (P),
Recall (R), and F1-score (F). Such measures are calculated
using the equations in Equation 1.
P =
TP
TP + FP
, R =
TP
TP + FN
, F = 2 · P · R
P + R
(1)
The “no free lunch” theorem suggests that there is no univer-
sally best learning algorithm [38]. In other words, the choice of
an appropriate algorithm should be based on its performance
for that particular problem and the properties of data that
characterize the problem. In this case, a variety of classifiers
distributed as part of Weka [39] were evaluated using 10-fold
cross-validation using their default hyper-parameters.
To conform to other comparable IDSs in ICS systems in
Table I, the classifiers were also selected based on their ability
to support a high-dimensional feature space. The classifiers
included:
• Generative models that consider conditional dependencies
in the dataset or assume conditional independence (e.g.
Bayesian Network, Naive Bayes).
• Discriminative models that aim to maximise information
gain or directly maps data to their respective classes
without modeling any underlying probability or structure
of the data (e.g. J48 Decision Tree, Support Vector
Machine).
vClassifier P R F Time (s)
Zero R 0.50 0.70 0.58 0.20
BayesNet 0.66 0.61 0.63 8.28
Naive Bayes 0.67 0.31 0.19 54.00
SVM - - - 28,800.00
Adaboost + JRip - - - 28,800.00
Random Forest 0.94 0.93 0.93 247.00
J48 0.87 0.87 0.87 480.00
TABLE III: Weighted average results following cross-
validation
To support classification experiments, a random subset of
approximately 60% of the dataset described in Section III-A
was selected for training, with the remaining 40% selected for
testing. Figure 3 reports the distributions of data points across
the target values in both the training and testing datasets.
Fig. 3: Distribution of data points across both training and
testing datasets
Table III illustrates the results for each classifier. Previous
work which have used a very small sample of this power
system dataset to support their classification experiments have
shown that the ensemble classifier which combines both the
Adaboost and JRipper models was found to be the best per-
forming [40]. However, in this work, when both the ensemble
classifier and Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier were
applied, both models were still training following approx-
imately 2 days of running. In this case, the models were
stopped and their classification performances were omitted in
the reporting of the results herein. Conversely, with F1-scores
of 0.93 and 0.87, the classifiers with the highest performances
were Random Forest and Weka’s implementation of the J48
decision tree method with no pruning respectively.
V. ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
To reiterate, the aim of AML is to automatically introduce
perturbations to the unseen data points in order to confuse the
pre-trained model. The following sections introduce the types
of AML attacks, as well as the methods used to automatically
generate adversarial samples.
A. Adversarial Attack Types
Depending on the phase and aspect of the machine learning
model that is being targeted, AML attacks can be described
in terms of four primary vectors: [13], [41]:
• The Influence of an attack’s affects the classifier’s de-
cision. Attacks can be further categorised as causative
attacks, which occur during the learning phase (poison
attacks), or exploratory attacks, which target the trained
model during the testing phases (evasion attacks).
• Security Violations affect either the integrity of the
model when the adversarial samples cause misclassifica-
tions, or when the high rate of misclassifications causes
the model to become unusable.
• Specificity refers to targeted attacks, where the adver-
sarial samples aim to target a specific target value, or
indiscriminate attacks, where the samples do not target a
specific target value.
• Privacy refers to attacks where the adversary’s goal is to
extract information from the classifier.
Papernot et al. [42] further categorise adversarial attacks
based on:
• Their complexity. The consequences of such attacks can
range from slightly reducing the confidence of a model’s
predictions to causing it to misclassify all unseen data
points.
• The knowledge an adversary may have. A white box
attack refers to when an attacker has useful knowledge
related to the learning model, such as it’s architecture, the
network’s traffic it reads, and the features used to support
its training. It is considered as being a black box attack
when an adversary has no information about the internal
workings of the target model.
Given that we have access to the full training dataset and
its features, and we don’t know the target model, the AML
approach presented in this work is classified as a being a grey-
box attack.
B. Adversarial Sample Generation Methods
There are various methods by which adversarial samples
can be generated. Such methods vary in complexity, the speed
of their generation, and their performance. An unsophisticated
approach towards crafting such samples is to manually perturb
the input data points. However, manual perturbations are
slow to generate and evaluate by comparison with automatic
approaches. Two of the most popular techniques towards auto-
matically generating perturbed samples include the Fast Gra-
dient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Jacobian based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA), presented by Goodfellow et al. [43] and
Papernot et al. [42] respectively.
Both methods rely on the methodology, that when adding
small perturbations (δ) to the original sample (X), the resulting
sample (X*) can exhibit adversarial characteristics (X* = X +
δ) [11] in that X* is now classified differently by the targeted
model. Moreover, both methods are also usually applied by
using a pre-trained MLP as the underlying model for the
adversarial sample generation.
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Dataset R1-PA1:VH R2:DF R2-PM11:I R3-PM5:I
Original test data 0.764515 0.361399 0.008482 0.026826
θ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 0.765000 0.361000 0.008480 0.026800
θ = 0.9, γ = 0.9 1.000000 0.538000 0.008600 0.026800
TABLE IV: An example of how features are perturbed using
JSMA
The FGSM method aims to target each of the features of
the input data by adding a specified amount of perturbation.
The perturbation noise is computed by the gradient of the
cost function J with respect to the input data. Let θ represent
the model parameters, x are the inputs to the model, y are
the labels associated with the input data,  is a value which
represents the extent of the noise to be applied, and J(θ,x,y)
is the cost function used to train the targeted neural network.
x∗ = x +  sign (∇x J(θ, x, y)) (1)
On the other hand, the JSMA method generates perturba-
tions using saliency maps. A saliency map identifies which
features of the input data are the most relevant to the model
decision being one class or another; these features if altered are
most likely affect the classification of the target values. More
specifically, an initial percentage of features (θ) is chosen
to be perturbed by a (γ) amount of noise. Then, the model
establishes whether the added noise has caused the targeted
model to misclassify or not. If the noise has not affected the
model’s performance, another set of features is selected and a
new iteration occurs until a saliency map appears which can
be used to generate an adversarial sample.
Given that the JSMA method may take a few iterations to
generate adversarial samples, the FGSM is computationally
faster [42]. However, as opposed to FGSM which alters each
feature, JSMA is a more complex and elaborate approach
which represents more realistic attacks as it progressively
alters a small percentage of features at a time. This allows for
more realistic and finer grained AML attacks, as adversaries
are able to define both the percentage of features to perturb
and the amount of perturbation to include when generating the
adversarial samples.
This work presents the use of JSMA in a grey-box attack,
in which the attacker has no knowledge of the target model
but has access to the full dataset and knowledge of features.
Despite not knowing the target model, we can approximate
samples that will cause the target model to misclassify using
another model due to the transferability of adversarial samples
across machine learning models [44].
In this case, the adversarial samples used in the experiments
herein were generated using the JSMA method. A pre-trained
MLP was used as the underlying model for the generation.
The code implementation used to create the adversarial data
was based on the CleverHans project [42]. Table IV shows the
transformation of the features of a malicious data point using
the JSMA method.
Predicted Predicted
0 1 0 1
Actual 0 2,840 6,149 Actual 0 10,610 3,1151 1,240 21,122 1 2,631 30,670
Random Forest J48
TABLE V: Confusion matrices for the original test set (Be-
nign = 0, Malicious = 1)
VI. EVALUATING SUPERVISED MODELS ON
ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES
Both the trained Random Forest and J48 models presented
in Section IV-B were first evaluated against the original testing
dataset. The F1-scores achieved by both classifiers were 0.67
and 0.66 respectively. The confusion matrix in Table V shows
how the predicted classes for each data point in the original
testing dataset compare against the actual ones. In compar-
ison to the Random Forest model, J48 demonstrated a high
percentage of correct predictions, thus less often miclassifying
the data points.
To explore how different combinations of the JSMA param-
eters affect the performance of the trained classifiers, adver-
sarial samples were generated from all malicious data points
present in the testing data by using a range of combinations of
θ and γ. The adversarial samples were joined with the benign
testing data points and subsequently presented to the trained
models. Figures 4 and 5 report the overall weighted-averaged
F1-scores for all adversarial combinations of JSMA’s θ and γ
parameters.
Fig. 4: Random Forest classification performance (F1-score)
on adversarial samples generated using JSMA
In comparison to Random Forest, the classification perfor-
mance of the J48 model achieved a decrease in F1-scores
across the majority of the θ and γ parameters. This may
indicate that J48 may be more sensitive, subsequently mis-
classifying malicious data points as benign. However, when
θ = 0.3, γ = 0.2 and θ = 0.2, γ = 0.7, the model achieves
a higher classification performance of 0.69 (an increase of 3
percentage points). This may indicate that the generation of
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Fig. 5: J48 classification performance (F1-score) on adversar-
ial samples generated using JSMA
some adversarial samples has made such data points more
distinct in discriminating between the target values.
Conversely, the classification performance of the Random
Forest model achieved an increase in F1-scores for the major-
ity of θ and γ pairs. This may indicate that Random Forest may
be a more robust classifier in correctly discriminating between
malicious and benign data points. However, when θ = 0.2, γ
= 0.4, the model’s classification performance decrease by 16
percentage points (F1-score = 0.57). Based on the dataset used
in the experiments presented in this paper, θ = 0.2, γ = 0.4
would be the optimal parameter an adversary would use to
successfully reduce the accuracy of a machine learning based
IDS, subsequently diverting malicious data points.
These findings demonstrate the importance of parameter-
tuning in applying JSMA for generating adversarial examples.
The JSMA model is likely to be more robust under white-box
conditions as it was designed but these results indicate that
with careful parameter tuning, this approach can be adapted
to work under black-box conditions. Although the F1-scores
increase in some instances, the attacker is primarily interested
in their malicious data points being classified as benign, such
that an increase in F1-score is not necessarily undesirable from
the attacker’s perspective.
The confusion matrices in Tables VI and VII provide a better
insight into the performance of the classifiers across the experi-
ments. In comparison to the original classification distributions
in Table V, both classifiers demonstrate a significant increase
in false positives. That is, data points with an actual target
value of malicious have been misclassified as being benign.
On the other hand, when θ = 0.5, γ = 0.9, the Random Forest
model’s true positive distribution increases, which may explain
as to why its F1-score also increases.
VII. DEFENDING ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
A few methods towards defending AML attacks have been
proposed in the literature. Two of the most popular techniques
Predicted Predicted
0 1 0 1
Actual 0 3,662 5,327 Actual 0 3,662 5,3271 12,325 10,037 1 4,103 18,259
θ = 0.1 γ = 0.3 θ = 0.3 γ = 0.2
TABLE VI: Confusion matrices after applying J48 to adver-
sarial testing samples (Benign = 0, Malicious = 1)
Predicted Predicted
0 1 0 1
Actual 0 2,840 6,149 Actual 0 2,840 6,1491 9,732 12,630 1 1,024 21,338
θ = 0.2 γ = 0.4 θ = 0.5 γ = 0.9
TABLE VII: Confusion matrices after applying Random
Forest to adversarial testing samples (Benign = 0, Malicious
= 1)
include adversarial training and adversarial sample detection.
The former has been explored in the field of visual computing,
where Goodfellow et al. [45] demonstrated that re-training
the neural network on a dataset containing both the original
and adversarial samples significantly improves its efficiency
against adversarial samples. The latter technique involves the
implementation of mechanisms that are capable of detecting
the presence of such samples using direct classification, neu-
ral network uncertainty, or input processing [18]. However,
these detection mechanisms have been found to be weak in
defending AML [18], [46].
Subsequently, in this paper, the robustness of supervised
machine learning classifiers against AML is further evaluated
using adversarial training. In this case, a random sample of
20% of the adversarial data points in the testing dataset which
significantly decreased the model’s performance (Random
Forest: θ = 0.2, γ = 0.4 and J48: θ = 0.1, γ = 0.3) were
included in the original training dataset.
The experiments described in Sections IV-B and VI were
repeated by retraining the models with the newly generated
training data and applying such models on all unseen adversar-
ial samples. Both the Random Forest and J48 models achieved
cross-validation F1-scores of 0.94 and 0.89 respectively.
Figures 6 and 7 report the overall weighted-averaged F1-
scores for all adversarial combinations of JSMA’s θ and γ
parameters following adversarial training. The results demon-
strated that for both classifiers, including adversarial samples
in the training data increased their classification performances.
More specifically, Random Forest and J48 achieved F1-scores
of 0.76 and 0.80 respectively, an increase of 2 and 11 percent-
age points in comparison to the classification performances
reported in Figures 4 and 5.
The classification performances demonstrated by the Ran-
dom Forest model achieves a greater overall increase in
comparison to the J48 model. That is, for Random Forest,
the classification performance for all combinations were im-
proved. Whereas for J48, only around 30% of the classification
performances increased significantly. This may imply that
Random Forest is a more robust model towards classifying
adversarial samples of all combinations of JSMA’s θ and γ
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parameters. This is intuitive given Strauss et al.’s [7] demon-
stration that ensemble machine learning algorithms are more
robust against adversarial techniques and Random Forests are
ensembles of decision trees (such as J48).
Fig. 6: Random Forest classification performance following
adversarial training (θ = 0.2, γ = 0.4)
Fig. 7: J48 classification performance following adversarial
training (θ = 0.1, γ = 0.3)
VIII. CONCLUSION
Due to their effectiveness and flexibility, machine learning
based IDSs are now recognised as fundamental tools for
detecting cyber attacks in ICS systems. Nevertheless, such
systems are vulnerable to attacks that may severely undermine
or mislead their capabilities, commonly known as Adversarial
Machine Learning (AML). Such attacks may have severe
consequences in ICS infrastructures, as adversaries could
potentially modify malicious data points in order to bypass the
IDS, causing delayed attack detection and extensive damages.
Thus, it is evident that understanding the applicability of these
attacks in ICS systems is necessary in order to develop more
robust machine learning based IDSs.
This paper explores how adversarial learning can be used
to target supervised models by generating adversarial samples
and exploring classification behaviours. To support the experi-
ments presented herein, an authentic power system dataset was
used to train and test widely used supervised machine learning
classifiers. The testing data was presented to a JSMA in order
to generate adversarial samples with a range of combinations
that affect the amount of noise and the number of features
to perturb. Such samples were evaluated against two of the
best performing classifiers, Random Forest and J48. Overall,
the classification performance for both models decreased by
16 and 20 percentage points when adversarial samples were
present.
The analysis also includes the exploration of how such
samples can support the robustness of supervised models using
adversarial training. A random sample of 20% of the generated
adversarial data points were included in the original training
dataset. The models were retrained and applied on all unseen
adversarial samples. Overall, the classification performance
of the Random Forest model reported a greater increase in
comparison to the J48 model. This demonstrates that Random
Forest is a more robust model towards classifying adversarial
samples of all combinations of JSMA parameters on the given
dataset.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Although the experiments described in this paper have
demonstrated that adversarial samples can successfully be gen-
erated using JSMA and affect the classification performance of
state-of-the-art supervised models, it is important to note that
there are several other methods of generating such samples to
consider (e.g. Iterative Gradient Sign, Carlini Wagner, Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks). In this case, as part of future work,
this study can be extended further to include different models
as a source for generating adversarial samples. Moreover,
AML should be further investigated against other models such
as LSTMs.
Finally, the robustness of the supervised models was demon-
strated using adversarial training. It is also important to note
that this method may not always be sufficient as it is difficult
to anticipate all possible types of adversarial machine learning
attacks against a given system. Therefore, there is a need to
investigate other possible defense mechanisms.
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